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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Facility: 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Elmira CF 
11-116-18 B 
Appearances: Cheryl Kates, Esq. 
P.O. Box 734 
Fairport, New York 14450 
Decision appealed: November 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. 
Board Member(s) Davis, Alexander 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's.Letter-brief received February 28, 2019 
AppellanCs Supplemental Letter-briefreceived March 28, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon:· Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), CO:MPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
/ fi _Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modi 1ed to ___ _ 
~firmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
Commissioner 
~ ~rmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeais Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination~! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of~e Appeals Unit's Findings and the sep~~te qndings ,,?f 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 6 :lJ9{ //Cf { 0 . 
( I 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - _Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 25 years to life upon his conviction of 
two counts of Murder in the second degree, CPW in the second degree,  
.  In the instant appeal, Appellant, through counsel, submits a disjointed letter-brief and a 
supplemental letter to challenge the November 2018 determination of the Board denying release 
and imposing a 24-month hold.  The arguments boil down to the following:  
(1) the decision is unlawful, arbitrary and capricious because the Board focused solely on 
the instant offenses (without specifying any “mitigating factor”) and community 
opposition (based on penal philosophy) without considering that he was not the shooter, 
other statutory factors, and the COMPAS instrument’s low scores; 
(2) the Board failed to adequately explain the COMPAS departure by specifying the scale 
deviated from and providing a reason for departure other than the instant offenses;  
(3) the Board failed to discuss all statutory factors on the record and in the denial decision;  
(4) the decision is conclusory and fails to adequately explain the parole denial;  
(5) the Board failed to make detailed mention in the record as to whether official defense 
attorney statements were solicited from both cases and, upon information and belief, 
any requests were sent to the incorrect address;  
(6) the Board failed to mention its review of the case plan in the decision;  
(7) the Board failed to properly consider Appellant’s age at the time of his criminal 
behavior as a mitigating factor;  
(8) the Board improperly considered community opposition; 
(9) the Board’s reliance on community opposition to deny parole was improper because, 
upon information and belief, it contains erroneous information and/or penal 
philosophy; 
(10) the Board imposed a higher standard and relied on penal philosophy by following a 
protocol against releasing inmates convicted of killing police officer and acting on PBA 
political pressure;  
(11) the decision constitutes an unauthorized resentencing to life without parole based 
solely on the Commissioners’ personal views as to the appropriate penalty and/or 
PBA/community opposition containing, on information and belief, erroneous 
information/penal philosophy, which is arbitrary and capricious, excessive, and cruel 
and unusual punishment; and 
(12) Appellant was improperly denied access to community opposition, victim impact 
statements, and requests for defense attorney statements. 
 
These arguments are without merit. 
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Standard for Discretionary Release on Parole 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward 
for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
While consideration of the statutory factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a 
prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 
(2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the 
Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).  In the 
absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must 
be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 
A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990). 
 
The Board’s Consideration of Parole 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered 
the appropriate factors, including: the instant offenses wherein Appellant participated in the in-
concert shooting death of a police officer sitting in his patrol car providing security to an unrelated 
witness in a “hit” ordered by incarcerated drug lords, fatally shot a woman who stole drugs and/or 
money from the drug distribution ring for which Appellant also was employed, and, as a youth, 
passed cocaine to a car passenger;1 Appellant’s drug dealing history in the community; his 
                                                 
1 The Board clearly understood Appellant, while having shot the woman, was not the gunman in the police officer’s 
murder.  (Tr. at 38, 44.)  Appellant’s role was to distract the officer while a co-defendant shot him.  (Tr. at 34-35.) 
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perception of how he became involved in crime and expressions of remorse for the instant offenses; 
his institutional record, including improved discipline, completion of ART and current work 
assignment in the mess hall with positive reports; and his parole release plan and support system.  
In addition, the Board had before it and considered, among other things, the sentencing minutes 
and a negative recommendation therein, an official statement by the DA in opposition to release, 
Appellant’s case plan, the COMPAS instrument, and Appellant’s submission, letters of support 
from the community, staff and others, and letters of assurance.  Appellant also was given the 
opportunity to raise additional matters during the interview. 
 
After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in 
determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  
In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the serious nature of Appellant’s two 
murder offenses.  See Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 
82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Copeland v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 
1157, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Jones v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & 
Cmty. Supervision, 151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 2017); Matter of Kenefick v. 
Sticht, 139 A.D.3d 1380, 31 N.Y.S.3d 367 (4th Dept. 2016).  The Board acknowledged low risk 
indicators in the COMPAS instrument, but explained it was departing from the COMPAS because 
the serious nature of the offenses demonstrated a continuous, well-thought-out course of conduct 
that caused a police officer’s assassination and a young woman’s murder.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a).  
While the decision acknowledged the DA’s official opposition, the Board did not mention or rely 
upon community opposition.  The Board encouraged Appellant to maintain positive institutional 
behavior, build upon healthy family attachment and complete all support services offered to him. 
 
That the Board found the serious nature of his crimes outweighed other factors does not 
constitute convincing evidence that the Board did not consider them, see Matter of McLain v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994), or render the decision 
irrational, see Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1273-74, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 719; Matter of Torres 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 300 A.D.2d 128, 128-29, 750 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (1st Dept. 
2002); Matter of Garcia, 239 A.D.2d at 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 418.  As the weight to be assigned 
each statutory factor is within the Board’s discretion, it committed no error by emphasizing the 
severity of the inmate’s offenses over other factors considered.2  See Matter of Robinson v. New 
                                                 
2 While the Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always necessary to support reliance on an inmate’s crime, 
Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, there are aggravating factors present here, namely, the 
calculated nature of two separate murders that resulted in a woman’s death and an officer’s assassination for drug lords.  
The inmate’s crimes went “well beyond the ‘unjustifiable taking and tragic loss of life’” that describes every murder.  
Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 22, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dept. 2007) (citation omitted). 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Scott, Todd DIN: 89-A-8015  
Facility: Elmira CF AC No.:  11-116-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 4 of 9) 
 
York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 
A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998).   
 
Compliance with the 2011 Amendments to Executive Law 
 
Appellant’s contention that the Board improperly ignored his low COMPAS scores is 
incorrect.  The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to 
“assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  The Board 
satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 
116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. 
Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. 
Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  This is encompassed 
in the Board’s regulations.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a).   However, the COMPAS is not predictive 
and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs 
information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, 
the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case 
review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense.  The 
amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply 
when deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  Rather, 
the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory 
factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera 
v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord 
Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014).   
 
That is exactly what occurred here.  The Board considered the COMPAS instrument and 
explained in its decision why it was departing from low risk indicators, such as the risk of felony 
violence, arrest and absconding, in denying release consistent with 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a).  
Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the Board was entitled to place more emphasis on the two murders.  
See Matter of Olmosperez v. Evans, 114 A.D.3d 1077, 1078, 980 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (3d Dept. 2014), 
aff’d 26 N.Y.3d 1014, 21 N.Y.S.3d 686 (2015); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 203, 981 
N.Y.S.2d at 871; see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d 
Dept. 2017); Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017).  
Any suggestion that the Board should have explained the COMPAS departure during the interview 
is mistaken.  Indeed, the Board had not yet deliberated and made a determination.   
 
 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Scott, Todd DIN: 89-A-8015  
Facility: Elmira CF AC No.:  11-116-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 5 of 9) 
 
Interview and Written Decision 
 
Appellant argues the Board failed to discuss all statutory factors on the record and in the 
decision.  This includes requests for official defense attorney statements, which are addressed below.  
He also objects that the Board did not mention its review of the case plan in the decision.  In addition, 
he asserts the written decision was conclusory insofar as the Board failed to cite all factors considered 
and explain the parole denial other than the instant offense and an allegedly vague reference to 
community opposition.  There is no merit to these claims. 
 
The requirement under 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.1(c) that the Board must discuss all applicable 
“factors” during the interview, excluding confidential information, concerns the “factors” listed in 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(d).  The record reflects the Board satisfied this requirement, as indicated above.  
However, the Board is not required to explain the weight accorded to each factor in its decision, 
Matter of Allis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 68 A.D.3d 1309, 1309, 890 N.Y.S.2d 200, 201 
(3d Dept. 2009); Matter of Garofolo v. Dennison, 53 A.D.3d 734, 735, 860 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (3d 
Dept. 2008), or explicitly mention each factor considered, Matter of Betancourt, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 
49 N.Y.S.3d 315; Matter of Mullins, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698.  While the Board’s 
amended regulation reinforces that detailed reasons must be given for a denial of release, it did not 
alter this well-established principle.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b). 
 
The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the 
denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 
N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 
435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 
(3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002).  
The Board addressed many factors and principles considered in individualized terms and explained 
what ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations, namely, the continuous, well-thought-
out course of conduct resulting in an officer’s assassination and a woman’s murder.  As discussed, 
the Board is permitted to place greater emphasis on the serious nature of the offenses.  While 
Appellant complains the Board made impermissibly vague reference to community opposition,3 
                                                 
3 Insofar as Appellant appears to allege a due process violation, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be 
conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence, Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980), and the New York State parole scheme does not implicate the due process clause, Barna v. 
Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; Matter of 
Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
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the Board did not cite community opposition.4  As for the case plan, the record reflects the Board 
discussed it during the interview.  That the Board did not mention it in the written decision does 
not render the decision invalid.  Cf. Matter of Betancourt, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315. 
 
Official Statements by Defense Attorneys 
 
Appellant objects that the Board did not mention if defense attorneys from both cases were 
contacted to solicit official statements and speculates that, even if solicited, the requests were sent 
to the incorrect addresses because the attorneys have moved since sentencing.  The Board 
addressed official statements during the interview, acknowledging the practice of soliciting official 
statements from the district attorney, defense attorney and the court and that the Board received a 
response in his case.  But nothing in the Executive Law nor the regulations requires the Board to 
discuss the requests on the record (in detail).  Nor did Appellant raise any issue.  See Matter of 
Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000).  And while DOCCS has 
been unable to locate copies of the original requests sent to Appellant’s defense attorneys, it 
recently sent new requests to his surviving attorneys, including both attorneys who represented 
him at sentencing in the instant offenses, at their current addresses and received no responses.  
Accordingly, there is no basis to set aside the Board’s decision.  Cf. Matter of Almonte v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 
N.Y.3d 905 (2017) (failure to consider sentencing minutes that contained no parole 
recommendation was harmless error); Matter of Davis v. Lemons, 73 A.D.3d 1354, 899 N.Y.S.2d 
919 (3d Dept. 2010) (same). 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
4 While Appellant’s objection concerns community opposition, we note the Board’s reference to official opposition 
was not impermissibly vague.  See, e.g., Matter of Branch v. Annuci, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1695, at 5, 7 (Sup. Ct. 
Seneca Co. May 5, 2017).  The sources of official statements received by the Board pursuant to the Executive Law 
are the sentencing court, the district attorney and the defense attorney (Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(vii)) and the 
only opposition from an official party in this case – as reflected in the Parole Board Report – was the district attorney. 
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Community Opposition, Penal Philosophy and Resentencing 
Appellant contends the Board's consideration of community opposition was improper 
because a family member of the victim made a statement, precluding pmpo1ted representation by the 
PBA. fu Appellant 's view, the Board othe1wise may not consider community opposition. However, 
the Board may receive and consider written communications from individuals, other than those 
specifically identified in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A), opposing an inmate's release to parole 
supe1vision. Matter of Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380, 91 
N.Y.S.3d 308, 311 (3d Dept. 2018) ("Contraiy to petitioner's contention, we do not find that [the 
Boai·d 's] consideration of ce1tain unspecified 'consistent community opposition' to his pai·ole 
release was outside the scope of the relevant statuto1y factors that may be taken into account in 
rendering a pai·ole release detennination"), appeal dismissed, 32 N.Y.3d 1219 (2019); Matter of 
Clai·k v. New York Bd. of Pai·ole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 89 N.Y.S.3d 134 (1st Dept. 2018) ("the Board 
permissibly considered letters in opposition to the pai·ole application submitted by public officials 
and members of the community"); Matter of Grigger v. New York State Div. of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 
850, 852- 53, 783 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (3d Dept. 2004) (recognizing 259-i(2)(c)(A)(v)'s list is not 
the exclusive infonnation the Boai·d may consider and persons in addition to victims and their 
families may submit letters), lv. denied, 4 N.Y.3d 704, 792 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2005). 
Appellant also speculates community opposition contained improper material that the Board 
relied upon, (incon ectly) equating any reliance on such opposition with adoption of the views 
motivating it. But as discussed, the Boai·d did not rely on community opposition in denying release. 
And even assuming the Boai·d received material containing improper matters, a decision will not 
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be reversed simply because material expressing personal penal philosophy or erroneous 
information was included in submissions which otherwise were properly considered.  See Matter 
of Duffy v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 132 A.D.3d 1207, 1209, 19 
N.Y.S.3d 610 (3d Dept. 2015) (“The Board’s decision will be upheld if there is nothing indicating 
it was influenced by, placed weight upon, or relied upon any improper matter, in the victim’s 
family statement or otherwise”); Matter of Bailey v. New York State Div. of Parole, Index No. 
973-16, Decision & Judgment dated Aug. 17, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (Hartman A.J.S.C.) 
(even assuming PBA letters contained inaccuracies or were inflammatory, Board would be 
permitted to consider them for what they were worth and will be presumed not to have relied on 
inappropriate matters therein unless decision indicates otherwise). 
 
The transcript as a whole does not support Appellant’s contention that he was denied a fair 
interview.  Matter of Rivers v. Evans, 119 A.D.3d 1188, 989 N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Bonilla v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 32 A.D.3d 1070, 1071, 820 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (3d 
Dept. 2006).  There is no support for Appellant’s claim that the Board imposed a heightened 
standard and relied on its personal opinion regarding penal philosophy, contra Matter of King v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 610 N.Y.S.2d 954 (1994) (Commissioner 
considered factors outside the scope of the applicable factors during interview, including penal 
philosophy, the historical treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty, life 
imprisonment without parole, and the consequences to society if those sentences are not in place), 
aff’g 190 A.D.2d 423, 432, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245, 251 (1st Dept. 1993) (quoting Commissioner), 
much less opinions on penal philosophy held by others including as set forth in the media.  
Appellant’s claim that the decision was determined by PBA political pressure is purely speculative 
and unsubstantiated.  See Matter of MacKenzie v. Evans, 95 A.D.3d 1613, 1614, 945 N.Y.S.2d 471, 
472 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 815, 955 N.Y.S.2d 553 (2012); Matter of Huber v. Travis, 264 
A.D.2d, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 1999).  There also is no evidence the Board’s decision was 
predetermined by an alleged protocol against releasing inmates convicted of killing police officers.  
See Matter of Bottom v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 1027, 773 N.Y.S.2d 717 (4th Dept.), appeal dismissed 
2 N.Y.3d 822, 781 N.Y.S.2d 285 (2004); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 
A.D.2d 899, 900, 714 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (3d Dept. 2000).  Appellant has failed to rebut the 
presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to judges and administrative fact-finders.  See 
People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People 
ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d 
Dept. 1992). 
 
Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper 
resentencing also is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the 
propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth 
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therein.  Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 
1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of 
Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  Appellant’s claim 
equates the Board’s denial of parole with the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility 
of parole.  But there is no basis to equate a parole denial, which is within the authorized sentence 
and may be reconsidered later, with an irrevocable life sentence in prison.  As for the Eighth 
Amendment, the denial of parole under a statute invoking discretion in parole determinations does 
not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  Carnes v. 
Engler, 76 Fed. Appx. 79 (6th Cir. 2003); Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d 552, 555 (10th Cir.), 
cert den. 506 U.S. 1008, 113 S. Ct. 624 (1992), rehearing denied 507 U.S. 955, 113 S. Ct. 1374 
(1993); Pacheco v. Pataki, No. 9:07–CV–0850, 2010 WL 3909354, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 
2010).  Appellant’s maximum sentence is life imprisonment. The Board acted within its authority 
and discretion to hold him for another 24 months, after which he will have the opportunity to 
reappear before the Board.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b); Matter of 
Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 
98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 
965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).  Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 24 months 
for discretionary release was excessive or improper.   
 
Record Access 
 
 Insofar as Appellant complains that DOCCS unlawfully failed to release records thwarting 
his right to appeal, his complaint is beyond the scope of this appeal.  9 NYCRR § 8006.3; id. §§ 
8006 et seq.  Nonetheless, we note counsel’s initial records request did not include a signed 
authorization from Appellant as required by 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(4).  While counsel claims 
an authorization was submitted, this claim is unsubstantiated.  Counsel was informed by DOCCS 
of the deficiency as early as December 10, 2018 (if not sooner) and inexplicably did not submit a 
signed authorization to the facility until April 2019 (dated March 26, 2019) to accompany a record 
request filed in late March.  In the meantime, counsel proceeded to perfect this administrative 
appeal on February 28, 2019, without seeking an extension of time pursuant to 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8006.2(a).  The record request therefore was not properly submitted prior to the timely perfection 
of Appellant’s administrative appeal.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(1), (4).  We also note Appellant 
is not entitled to confidential victim impact statements, if any.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.4(e).  In 
addition, we understand DOCCS has not released records responsive to other requests because 
counsel has refused to pay the associated fees. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
